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Humans regularly help strangers, even when interactions are apparently unobserved and
unlikely to be repeated. Such situations have been simulated in the laboratory using
anonymous one-shot games (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma) where the payoff matrices used
make helping biologically altruistic. As in real-life, participants often cooperate in the
lab in these one-shot games with non-relatives, despite that fact that helping is under
negative selection under these circumstances. Two broad explanations for such behavior
prevail. The “big mistake” or “mismatch” theorists argue that behavior is constrained
by psychological mechanisms that evolved predominantly in the context of repeated
interactions with known individuals. In contrast, the cultural group selection theorists posit
that humans have been selected to cooperate in anonymous one-shot interactions due
to strong between-group competition, which creates interdependence among in-group
members. We present these two hypotheses before discussing alternative routes by
which humans could increase their direct fitness by cooperating with strangers under
natural conditions. In doing so, we explain why the standard lab games do not capture
real-life in various important aspects. First, asymmetries in the cost of perceptual errors
regarding the context of the interaction (one-shot vs. repeated; anonymous vs. public)
might have selected for strategies that minimize the chance of making costly behavioral
errors. Second, helping strangers might be a successful strategy for identifying other
cooperative individuals in the population, where partner choice can turn strangers into
interaction partners. Third, in contrast to the assumptions of the prisoner’s dilemma model,
it is possible that benefits of cooperation follow a non-linear function of investment. Non-
linear benefits result in negative frequency dependence even in one-shot games. Finally, in
many real-world situations individuals are able to parcel investments such that a one-shot
interaction is turned into a repeated game of many decisions.
Keywords: human cooperation, one-shot games, prisoner’s dilemma, error-management, cultural group selection,
strong reciprocity
HUMAN HELPFULNESS
One doesn’t have to observe humans in their natural habitat
for long to witness many and varied examples of prosocial
behavior, often directed towards complete strangers. People might
vacate a seat on a crowded bus or train to let an elderly
person sit down; hold open a door for others; or help a
struggling parent to carry their pram down a flight of stairs.
Humans also willingly donate resources, such as money or
food, to others for example by giving to charity (e.g., Frey and
Meier, 2004; Soetevent, 2005). These charitable donations are
typically directed at recipients the helpful individual does not
know or will expect to meet in the future. This propensity
to help unrelated others who reside outside our regular social
circle is striking when one considers that these helpful acts
are seemingly unobserved and many of the interactions are
unlikely to persist beyond the current round. To explain
why humans are so helpful under conditions that seem to
predict selfishness, researchers have attempted to bring this
behavior into the laboratory by creating stylized games where
subjects can cooperate with or help one another, but where
payoffs are structured such that self-interested behaviors yield
greater rewards. One of the most widely-used paradigms is
the anonymous one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game (Luce and
Raiffa, 1957). In this game, two interacting players simultaneously
choose between cooperating or defecting. Payoffs are structured
such that mutual cooperation yields higher payoffs for both
than mutual defection, but defecting yields a higher individual
payoff than cooperating regardless of how the partner behaves.
Hence there is a temptation to defect even if the partner
cooperates (see Figure 1). This game can be modeled with
more than two players with similar incentives, yielding a
temptation to defect when others cooperate: this is an n-
player prisoner’s dilemma game (also commonly referred to as
a public goods game, Ledyard, 1995). Regardless of whether
the game is played with two or more than two players, in a
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma the evolutionarily stable strategy
(Maynard-Smith, 1982) is to defect. Another game that has
been widely used is the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986).
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FIGURE 1 | Payoffs accruing to (Player 1, Player 2) according to each
player’s decision to cooperate (C) or defect (D) in a social dilemma are
shown. R is the reward for mutual cooperation, T is the temptation to
defect, S is the sucker’s payoff and P is the punishment for mutual
defection. A game satisfies the assumptions of the prisoner’s dilemma
where T > R > P > S. The snowdrift game is captured wherever T > R > S
> P. Thus, the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game differ only in the
best possible response to a partner’s defection: in the prisoner’s dilemma, the
best response is to defect whereas in the snowdrift game, the best response
is to cooperate.
This is a two-player game where one player (the “dictator”)
is endowed with a sum of money and can choose to give
none, some or all of the endowment to the partner. The
“receiver” in the game has no power and must accept any
division of the endowment offered by the dictator. As in
the prisoner’s dilemma game, individuals can maximize their
earnings in the game by behaving selfishly and keeping the entire
endowment.
Empirical studies have shown that humans often cooperate
in anonymous one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games (or give
money in dictator games) despite the fact that not contributing
is the optimal solution (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2005;
Engel, 2011). It has been suggested that helping in the absence
of obvious rewards emerges from proximate psychological
mechanisms that make helping others subjectively rewarding
for the actor (Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Camerer, 2007;
Harbaugh et al., 2007). To explain why these psychological
mechanisms exist, one has to ask under which conditions
they are likely to have been favored by Natural Selection.
The two dominant current explanations—the “big mistake
hypothesis” (also known as the “mismatch hypothesis”) and
the “cultural group selection hypothesis”—mainly disagree on
the question of whether anonymous one-shot interactions were
absent in human evolutionary history until very recently, and
hence whether helping strangers is based on a psychological
constraint or is instead adaptive under certain circumstances
(specifically, when interaction partners belong to the same
cultural group) (Rand and Nowak, 2013). Here, we first present
these two hypotheses in more detail. We then move on to
discuss how the laboratory game settings may differ from
real-life interactions with strangers not only with respect to
population structure but also in other fundamental ways. Based
on this assessment, we will argue that there are several plausible
routes by which cooperative behavior towards strangers could
increase an individual’s direct fitness (Table 1). We hope that
this evaluation will stimulate researchers to use or develop
new experimental paradigms, such that our knowledge of
the proximate mechanisms that underpin cooperation can be
complemented with a better understanding of the adaptive
significance of such strategies.
COOPERATION—A BIG MISTAKE?
Some researchers have argued that the expression of prosocial
behaviors in laboratory anonymous, one-shot encounters can
be explained by mis-firing of psychological mechanisms in a
context we are not evolutionarily adapted to (e.g., Cosmides and
Tooby, 1989; Hoffman et al., 1998; Ben-Ner and Putterman, 2000;
Johnson et al., 2003; Tooby et al., 2006). The line of reasoning
is that the proximate mechanisms underpinning human social
behavior evolved in close-knit, small groups comprised of kin and
stable interaction partners, where no interaction was ever truly
one-shot or anonymous. In such an environment, an individual
that was predisposed to help group members would likely have
been compensated for their investment, either via indirect benefits
to kin (Hamilton, 1964a,b) or via personal benefits arising from
future interactions with the recipient (Trivers, 1971) or observers
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Roberts, 1998). It is clear that these
putative ancestral environments were fundamentally different to
the modern day environment of most humans and especially
to the artificial setup of most laboratory games. It is argued,
therefore, that subjects in laboratory settings rely on psychological
mechanisms that evolved in the context of repeated, non-
anonymous interactions and that our predisposition to cooperate
in the lab (or with strangers in the real world) might, therefore, be
an evolutionary relic of times gone by. In support of the so-called
(Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Fehr and Henrich, 2003) mismatch
or big mistake hypothesis, there are several instances where
imperfect human behavior can be attributed to the mismatch
between our evolved psychology and our current environment.
For example, the common tendency to be phobic of ancestrally
dangerous stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders) relative to more pressing
modern-day threats (e.g., cars, guns); and the proclivity to ingest
excessive quantities of foods that are high in sugar, fat and
salt based on their relative abundance nowadays as compared
with ancestral environments (Irons, 1998) can both be explained
as psychological mechanisms that on average produced fitness
enhancing outcomes in ancestral environments but that no longer
deliver such benefits—and can even be harmful—in the modern
world (Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; Tooby et al., 2006).
Nevertheless, critics of the big mistake hypothesis have
questioned the validity of assumption that ancestral social
environments were devoid of anonymous one-shot encounters.
Instead, it seems probable that even ancestral hunter-gatherers
probably had some encounters with strangers with no obvious
future follow-up, for example in the context of interactions
outside their immediate social group (e.g., trading, feuds and so
on, Lee, 1972; Wiessner, 1982; Keeley, 1996; Fehr and Henrich,
2003; Hill et al., 2011). It can be shown that, despite our
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Table 1 | The key features of different theories to explain why humans cooperate in ostensibly anonymous, one-shot encounters.
Theory Where did strategies
used in lab games evolve?
How might individuals
benefit from helping strangers?
Is helping behavior
adaptive in anonymous, one-
shot lab games?
Mismatch/
Big-mistake
Strategies evolved in context of
repeated interactions with known
partners.
No benefit No
Between group
competition
Strategies evolved to deal with (in-
group) strangers even in one-shot,
anonymous situations.
Benefit occurs in context of
between-group competition.
Unclear whether individual benefits
directly (interdependence) or
whether benefits accrue indirectly
to kin residing in the group.
Maybe—if other people in the
game are the relevant in-group and
if helping in this setting somehow
increases the group’s performance
in competition with other groups.
This prediction needs empirical
verification.
Misperceiving
interaction
duration or
anonymity
Strategies evolved to deal
with strangers in situations
with a probability of being
anonymous/one-shot but where
there was uncertainty over these
parameters.
Individuals benefit from helping
strangers if there are asymmetries
in costs of misperceiving
interaction duration/anonymity.
No
Partner choice
via exploration
Strategies evolved to identify
potential cooperative interaction
partners from the population.
Individuals benefit from helping
if this allows them to identify
cooperative partners in the
population and to establish
relationships with these partners.
No
Alternative payoff
matrices
Strategies evolved in the context of
non-linear games.
Individual can benefit from helping
if benefits of investing in public
good are negative frequency
dependent.
No
Parceled
investments
Strategies evolved in contexts
where individuals could parcel
investments into smaller
units, thereby turning one-shot
interactions into games involving
repeated decisions.
Individuals benefit if partner’s
cooperative decisions/continuing
the interaction are conditional upon
the individual acting helpfully.
No
evolutionary heritage, humans are able to identify interactions
where helping is likely to yield a return benefit (e.g., by identifying
kin, by predicting when behavior is likely to be observed or not, or
when interactions are likely to be repeated)—and adjust behavior
accordingly (Fehr and Henrich, 2003). For example, various
studies have shown that people recognize and preferentially help
kin over non-kin (Barber, 1994; Gurven, 2004); that we cooperate
more when investments are public rather than anonymous (e.g.,
Milinski et al., 2002; Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Soetevent,
2005; Lamba and Mace, 2010); and that we cooperate less when
interactions will not be repeated or will end soon (e.g., Gächter
and Falk, 2002; Gächter et al., 2008). Moreover, recent work
has suggested that while people may use heuristics from daily
life to guide cooperative decision making, these heuristics can
be rapidly updated to reflect the conditions imposed in the
artificial lab setting (Rand et al., 2012, 2014). In fact even fish are
apparently able to adjust levels of cooperation to the likelihood
of repeated interactions (Oates et al., 2010). Thus, critics of
the big mistake hypothesis have good arguments that humans
do have the cognitive machinery to detect when an interaction
is likely to yield direct return benefits, and to adjust behavior
accordingly.
If, as seems likely, interactions with strangers probably did exist
in our evolutionary history, why do humans have a psychology
that seems geared towards cooperating in these contexts, given
that the short-term, payoff-maximizing approach is apparently
to defect under such conditions? For cooperative investments
to come under positive selection, the behavior must form part
of a strategy that on average increases the fitness of the bearer.
In other words, cooperative actors must somehow ultimately be
repaid for their investments. Broadly, it has been suggested that
the ultimate benefits associated with making costly investments
could arise either with or without assortative population structure
(often referred to as group-level (or multi-level) and individual-
level selection in the literature). We consider these two arguments
in turn.
BETWEEN-GROUP COMPETITION
Whenever populations are structured into groups of relatively
stable composition, there is potential for competition between
groups. The stronger such competition between groups is
the more individual and group interests are closely aligned,
and selection may favor strategies that prioritize unconditional
contributions towards group success. The tendency for such
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“multi-level selection” to promote cooperation is seen at all levels
of life and several of the major evolutionary transitions identified
by Szathmáry and Smith (1995) rely on the repression of lower
order conflict to bring about a higher-level advantage. According
to accounts of helping based on between-group competition in
humans (e.g., Gintis, 2000; Henrich, 2004; Boyd and Richerson,
2009), group-level benefits favor individual costly investments
(even in the absence of obvious mechanisms to be directly
compensated) because within-group helping generally predicts
group success in the face of extinction threats (e.g., due to
competition with other groups, environmental catastrophes etc.,
Gintis, 2000). Similar arguments emphasizing the importance
of group-level benefits have been proposed by biologists for
the evolution of helping behavior among non-relatives in
cooperatively breeding groups (e.g., Kokko et al., 2001) and have
been formulated with the notion of interdependence replacing
the relatedness term in Hamilton’s rule (Roberts, 2005). Although
group-level benefits could theoretically arise via genetic group
selection, the high levels of between-group genetic variance that
would be necessary to facilitate selection are thought to be
unrealistic given the genetic evidence for (female) migration
among groups (Seielstad et al., 1998; Bell et al., 2009). Moreover,
since genetic between-group selection is thought to be a small
force in large groups, it is unlikely to account for large-
scale cooperation seen in modern day human societies. Thus,
colleagues have focussed instead on the concept of cultural
group selection, whereby immigrating individuals are expected
to adopt the cultures of the new group, thereby reducing the
behavioral variance that migrating individuals would otherwise
have (Boyd and Richerson, 1982; Henrich, 2004; Bell et al.,
2009). Cultural group selection of cooperative traits is thought
to be facilitated by a general predisposition to learn socially from
others, which would be adaptive where the cost of information
acquisition was sufficiently high (Boyd and Richerson, 1982,
2009; Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Guzmán et al., 2007; Richerson
and Boyd, 2008; but see Eriksson and Coultas, 2009; André and
Morin, 2011). Selection for social learning outside the cooperative
domain could then facilitate the evolution of cooperative
cultural norms within populations. If populations varied in these
norms and if the outcomes of competition between populations
varied according to within-group levels of cooperation, then
cultural group selection could favor cooperative strategies. The
benefits of within-group cooperation could, in turn, select
for psychological predispositions to cooperate with in-group
members while punishing defectors (i.e., “strong reciprocity”,
Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and Henrich, 2003; Boyd
and Richerson, 2009), even in anonymous, one-shot encounters.
Evidence for cross-cultural variation in cooperative tendency
across societies (Henrich et al., 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010; Gächter
and Herrmann, 2009; Gächter et al., 2010; House et al.,
2013) has been touted as key evidence for the existence of
between-group variation in cooperative norms that could be
the basis for such selection (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al.,
2005).
Nevertheless, the assumptions underpinning the cultural
group selection account of human cooperation have been
subject to debate (Burnham and Johnson, 2005; Hagen and
Hammerstein, 2006; West et al., 2011). For instance, while it is
often assumed that the predisposition for conformity necessary
to catalyze the emergence of within-group cooperation is an
adaptive trait, it has been demonstrated that non-conformist
transmission dominates conformist strategies in evolutionary
models (Eriksson and Coultas, 2009). Moreover, analytical
models have shown that a tendency for conformist transmission
can undermine the evolution of helping behaviors (Feldman
et al., 1985; Lehmann et al., 2008), not catalyze them as was
originally predicted. Thus, in contrast to the predictions of
the cultural group selection models, it is apparently easier for
costly helping strategies to evolve under genetic systems of
inheritance rather than via culture. Another central assumption
of cultural group selection models is that individuals are
constrained by a predisposition for conformity to blindly adopt
the behaviors of others, even when strategic non-conformity
would increase biological fitness (e.g., Gintis, 2003; Boyd and
Richerson, 2009). The validity of this assumption is contested
(Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; André and Morin, 2011;
El Mouden et al., 2014; Morin, 2014). Instead, it has been
argued that the conditions under which cultural group selection
would be expected to produce a maladaptive tendency to
copy altruistic behavior are prohibitively restrictive (El Mouden
et al., 2014; Morin, 2014) and, moreover, that antagonistic co-
evolution should act to curb psychological predispositions to
copy maladaptive actions (El Mouden et al., 2014). Indeed,
strong empirical evidence suggests that people are sensitive to the
benefits of imitation and do not copy blindly as supposed (Rendell
et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2012; Morin, 2014). More recently,
it has also been suggested that asymmetries among individuals
within groups can facilitate within-group cooperation when
there is between-group competition, without having to resort to
cultural transmission, reciprocity or punishment (Gavrilets and
Fortunato, 2014). Specifically, when some individuals are able
to benefit more than others from the production of a (within-
group) public good (e.g., if they are dominant to others in
the group), it pays for these individuals to invest more in the
production of the public good, and this effect is particularly
pronounced when groups are in competition with one another.
Thus, population structure and between-group competition
can facilitate within-group cooperation even in the absence
of culturally transmitted tendencies to copy cooperative and
punitive behaviors.
Empirical evidence for cultural group selection has also
been called into question. While the existence of inter-cultural
variation in cooperative norms (e.g., Henrich et al., 2001, 2005)
seemed initially supportive of the predictions of the cultural
group selection models, more recent empirical work has shown
that substantial within-culture variation in cooperation exists that
can be explained by local demography and ecology rather than
culture (Lamba and Mace, 2011; Nettle et al., 2011; Schroeder
et al., 2014). The extent of within-culture variation has been
demonstrated to be comparable to that previously observed
between cultures (Lamba and Mace, 2011) and, since many
of the former studies sampled only one or a few populations
per culture, it is argued that much of the measured variation
that has been attributed to cultural differences may not in
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fact exceed within-group variation in these traits. Furthermore,
cultural group selection models do not predict unconditional
help towards any recipient but instead only towards members of
the relevant in-group. Out-group members should not receive
help and may in fact be harmed (“parochial altruism”, Bernhard
et al., 2006). There is no a-priori reason for human subjects
in laboratory one-shot games to assume that the co-players are
members of the in-group, and so deserving of help. One might
just as easily expect that subjects assume that co-players are
out-group members, which would not predict costly cooperative
behavior. Finally, it appears biologically questionable that in-
group members are indeed unfamiliar with each other and
that they can be reasonably certain that there will not be
any future interactions; such a scenario would be much more
likely with out-group members. Thus, even with a cultural
group selection account of cooperation, human behavior in
stylized laboratory games still remains a puzzle because we
have to understand why co-players are apparently treated as in-
group rather than out-group members (Burnham and Johnson,
2005).
DIRECT BENEFITS WITHOUT BETWEEN-GROUP
COMPETITION
The cultural group selection approach makes assumptions
about population structure (grouping) and competition between
these units without specifying whether a tendency to help
strangers increases indirect fitness (through relatedness) or direct
fitness (through interdependence). An alternative approach is to
investigate conditions under which helping strangers may yield
direct benefits in the absence of any specific population structure.
One plausible suggestion is that human cooperation in one-shot
games can be thought of as a strategy that minimizes costly
error types (Burnham and Johnson, 2005; Yamagishi et al., 2007;
Delton et al., 2011; Morin, 2014). Error management theory
assumes that where there is uncertainty over the perceptual
accuracy of the environment (such that all is not necessarily
as it seems) and there are asymmetries in the costs of false-
positive and false-negative error types, then evolution should
favor strategies that minimize the costlier of the two error types
(Johnson et al., 2013). It is important to bear in mind that
Natural Selection is expected to favor strategies that on average
increase the fitness of the bearer rather than to produce perfect
behavior in every context. In other words, assessment errors
mean that adaptive strategies will sometimes produce behavioral
mistakes (West et al., 2011; Morin, 2014). For example, consider
a meerkat who hears an alarm call indicating the likely, but only
probabilistic, presence of a predator. In such a scenario there are
likely to be asymmetric costs associated with erroneous behavioral
responses. Responding to a false alarm call by fleeing incurs
energetic and opportunity costs, while failing to flee when the
threat is real incurs a far higher possible cost of being caught
by a predator. Based on these asymmetric costs of behavioral
errors, a strategy of “if hear alarm call, then flee” might be on
average adaptive even if it produces several behavioral errors
(i.e., fleeing in response to false alarms). In the context of
interactions with strangers, it may well be the case that humans
experience perceptual uncertainty over several features of the
interaction, any or all of which may favor strategies that err
on the side of caution by cooperating even when there is little
ostensible benefit to doing so. The uncertainty could stem from
inaccuracies in perceiving the likely duration of the interaction,
whether the interaction is truly anonymous, or the payoff matrix
of the interaction. We discuss how perceptual uncertainty in any
of these features might select for broadly cooperative strategies
below.
MISPERCEIVING INTERACTION DURATION OR ANONYMITY
It has been argued that cooperation can be favored by evolution
if there is even a small possibility that the interaction will be
repeated and if this possibility is fundamentally unpredictable
(Delton et al., 2011). Such a strategy could be adaptive even
if it produces several behavioral errors (i.e., cooperating when
no return benefits are possible). In a laboratory setting, an
experimenter can exogenously impose the one-shot structure
on the game (such that subjects can be certain that the
interaction is not repeated) but this is unlike real life interactions
with strangers, where we might often experience a degree of
uncertainty about whether we might meet again. Using agent-
based simulations, Delton et al. (2011) showed, using a mix of
agents playing either always-defect (ALLD) or the conditionally
cooperative strategy tit-for-tat (TFT), that cooperation can
indeed be favored so long as there is a non-zero probability
that the interaction might be repeated (and the partner is
TFT rather than ALLD). In this setting, uncertainty over the
number of interactions favors cooperation also in interactions
that turn out to be one-shot. Cooperation is favored because
mistaking a repeated interaction for one-shot (and therefore
defecting in the first round of the game) incurred a greater
cost than mistaking a one-shot interaction for repeated (and
therefore erroneously cooperating). This is due to the unforgiving
nature of TFT, whereby defecting in the first round of the
game prompts the partner to defect in the next round and thus
establishes mutual defection for the duration of the interaction.
Strategies that take a chance on the interaction being repeated
(and the partner playing TFT) by cooperating in the first
round could instead establish mutually productive, cooperative
relationships with TFT partners. In support of the idea, it
has additionally been argued that due to autocorrelation of
individual locations over time, interacting with an individual once
leads to an increased probability of interacting with the same
individual again in the future (Krasnow et al., 2013). Thus, by
definition, meeting a partner once implies that the interaction
will be repeated and that conditionally cooperative strategies will
prevail.
Nevertheless, the generality of these findings have been
challenged on the grounds that only interactions with
unrepentant (ALLD) and unforgiving (TFT) strategies were
explored (McNally and Tanner, 2011; Zefferman, 2014a,b). ALLD
is unrepentant in the sense that it is committed to play defect
in all rounds; it cannot change its behavior if the interaction
turns out to be repeated. TFT is unforgiving in the sense that
any defection by the partner will be immediately reciprocated
with defection. By contrast, it was verbally argued that the
importance of uncertainty for catalyzing one-shot cooperation
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might be substantially reduced if agents employed strategies that
allowed for flexible responses, either an increased propensity
to cooperate once the interaction extended beyond round one
or a non-zero probability to forgive cheating partners in a
repeated interaction (McNally and Tanner, 2011). This is because,
with flexible strategies, the importance of cooperating in the
first round would be reduced substantially since cooperation
could still be established (or re-established) beyond round
one (McNally and Tanner, 2011). Thus, the question of why
individuals cooperate in ostensible one-shot interactions would
remain unresolved. Indeed, the inclusion of repentant and
forgiving strategies under the same conditions of uncertainty
has subsequently been shown to vastly diminish the advantage
to cooperating in (ostensible) one-shot interactions; in some
cases actually reversing the direction of selection (Zefferman,
2014a). Zefferman (2014a) proposes that the failure of the
model to predict one-shot cooperation when an arguably more
realistic strategy set is considered emphasizes the importance
of social learning of local cooperative norms (i.e., the cultural
group selection approach) for explaining one-shot cooperation.
Ultimately, empirical studies are likely to be important for
understanding whether defection in an ostensible one-shot
encounter precludes cooperation from being established (as
predicted by Delton et al., 2011; Delton and Krasnow, 2014) or,
instead, whether humans are more likely to forgive an interaction
partner who starts by defecting but then switches to cooperation
if the interaction continues.
While the Delton et al. (2011) model assumed that
psychological responses to cooperate evolved in the context of
directly reciprocal interactions, one also has to consider that
under real world scenarios, actions might also be observed
by uninvolved bystanders, who adjust their behavior towards
the actor accordingly. For example, under indirect reciprocity
models, helpful acts are reciprocated by third-parties rather than
by recipients. Misperceiving that an interaction is unobserved
by bystanders might carry similar costs to misperceiving the
likely duration, in that erroneous defection incurs greater costs
than erroneous cooperation in both scenarios. Thus, error-
management might still play a role in sustaining cooperation
but because individuals can never be certain that their actions
are unobserved, rather than because they misperceive interaction
duration. If there is even a slight possibility that actions will
be observed—and if being seen as unhelpful carries greater
costs than helping when no one is watching (as has been
proposed in models of judgment bias, Rankin and Eggimann,
2009)—then selection might favor psychological mechanisms
that make us behave as though we are observed most of
the time. Empirical evidence suggests that reputation concerns
have an important influence on prosocial tendency: people are
typically more cooperative in public rather than anonymous
laboratory games (e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Lamba
and Mace, 2010) and even exposing people to subtle cues
of being watched (in the form of eye images) increases
prosocial behavior under some circumstances (e.g., Haley and
Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; but see Fehr and Schneider,
2010; Raihani and Bshary, 2012 for failed replications). The
presence of potential observers is made even more important
when one considers that, via gossip, one’s positive or negative
actions could be broadcast to several “observers”, who need
not even have been present at the time of the event (e.g.,
Sommerfeld et al., 2007, 2008; Feinberg et al., 2014). Thus,
an error-managing strategy might often cooperate—even when
interactions seem to be anonymous—to minimize the reputation
costs of not cooperating if the interaction turns out to be
observed.
PARTNER CHOICE VIA EXPLORATION
Many of the games used to explore cooperation under laboratory
settings impose a forced-play structure on subjects: players cannot
choose who they want to interact with or to leave unproductive
relationships (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). While cooperation
can evolve under such circumstances in artificial simulations (e.g.,
via clustering or assortment of cooperators, Nowak and May,
1992; Fletcher and Doebeli, 2009; but see Hauert and Doebeli,
2004), network reciprocity based on spatial structure does not
seem to support cooperation in empirical studies (Grujic´ et al.,
2014). Indeed, assuming that players are constrained to use pure
strategies and are forced to interact with one another is unlikely
to reflect the conditions under which real-word relationships
operate. Instead, individuals are typically able to choose
interaction partners, and can choose to continue interactions with
cooperative partners while terminating relationships that prove
unproductive (e.g., Noë and Hammerstein, 1994; Baumard et al.,
2013).
The possibility for partner choice might therefore favor
unconditionally helpful strategies if being observed as helpful
increases the chance of being chosen for future interactions.
Importantly, the chooser need not make costly investments to
reimburse the helper for their actions. Instead, simply being
chosen for a mutually productive interaction (e.g., producing
offspring, cohabiting) could compensate the helper for their
initial investment (e.g., Bshary and Grutter, 2006; McNamara
et al., 2008). According to the “competitive altruism” theory,
competition for interaction partners occurs within a biological
market (Noë and Hammerstein, 1994); and individuals who
produce the strongest signals of quality (via helping) will
be preferred as partners (Roberts, 1998; Lotem et al., 2003;
Barclay, 2011). Empirical evidence suggests that competitive
altruism might be an important mechanism underpinning
human helping behavior: people choose interaction partners
based on cooperative reputation (e.g., Barclay and Willer,
2007; Sylwester and Roberts, 2010, 2013) and avoid defectors
(Rockenbach and Milinski, 2011), hence individuals compete
with one another to advertise helpful actions (Raihani and Smith,
in press).
The possibility for partner choice could also promote
cooperation, even with unknown individuals in an anonymous
setting, because individuals can use cooperative first moves to
test the response of the partner and then decide whether to
continue the interaction or not. Error-management might still
play a role but, unlike the Delton et al. (2011) model, the
cost of not cooperating would be that one misses out on the
chance to have a mutually productive relationship with the
partner, rather than that one is stuck in a mutually destructive
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relationship. It has been demonstrated that where there is
extrinsically maintained variation in cooperative tendency within
a population (maintained by differences in quality or ability
to invest in the partner, McNamara and Leimar, 2010, or by
mutation, immigration, recombination or epistasis, McNamara
et al., 2004), then this variation could select for cooperative
strategies because this is a way to identify whether the partner
is also cooperative (McNamara et al., 2004). In such scenarios
cooperation can evolve whenever the benefit of interacting with
a cooperator outweighs the benefit of occasional exploitation.
Variability in cooperativeness, together with a long lifespan
during which to reap the benefits of a productive partnership,
can then pave the way for the evolution of choosiness because,
given sufficient variation in partner quality it can pay to leave a
less cooperative partner in hope of finding a more cooperative
individual next time (Sherratt and Roberts, 1998; McNamara
et al., 2008). In many real-world scenarios, initial cooperative
acts might often be low cost (in comparison to the potential
benefits of establishing a mutually productive relationship) but
investments could increase as the relationship becomes more
established (e.g., Roberts and Sherratt, 1998). For example, while
we do not routinely see people handing out $100 bills to strangers,
low cost helpful acts, such as holding a door open or assisting
with heavy bags, are relatively commonplace. These low cost
investments are consistent with the idea that cooperation could be
used as an exploratory strategy to strike up mutually productive
relationships with other individuals in the population. Nowadays,
modern technology may even allow us to develop long-distance
relationships as a consequence of chance encounters where we
help or are helped by others.
ALTERNATIVE PAYOFF MATRICES
Most theoretical and laboratory studies of cooperation in humans
have assumed a prisoner’s dilemma type payoff-matrix, where
benefits scale linearly with investments. In such scenarios, the
payoff-maximizing strategy in a one-shot game is to defect
regardless of how the partner(s) behave. As a consequence,
explanations based on assortment, repeated interactions or
relatedness are typically invoked to account for the emergence and
stability of cooperative behavior. The assumption that all social
dilemmas have the structure of an n-player prisoner’s dilemma
is, however, flawed (Kollock, 1998; Archetti and Scheuring,
2011). Alternative social dilemmas with different payoff matrices
can yield evolutionarily stable cooperative strategies without
having to invoke assortment, relatedness or repeated interactions
(e.g., Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Archetti, 2009a,b; Archetti and
Scheuring, 2011). For example, consider the 2-player snowdrift
game. This game describes two drivers traveling in opposite
directions when they come across a snowdrift blocking the
road. Neither driver can get home unless the road is cleared.
Although each driver prefers the other to do the clearing,
each would also rather clear the snowdrift himself than for
the snowdrift to not be cleared at all. As a consequence,
in the two-player snowdrift game, the best response to a
cooperative partner is to defect, while the best response to a
defecting partner is to cooperate. Thus, the strategic payoffs
differ markedly from those in more frequently used prisoner’s
dilemma, where defecting always yields the highest payoff
(Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Figure 1). An n-player snowdrift
game is often referred to as a volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann,
1985). In its simplest form, this game assumes that a public
good will be produced if one player cooperates and that
additional investments do not increase the magnitude of the
public good. Thus, unlike the traditional n-player prisoner’s
dilemma, benefits are a non-linear function of investment
and cooperation is therefore expected to be under negatively
frequency dependent selection. As in the snowdrift game, the
benefit of the public good being produced is larger than the
cost associated with producing it, such that all players would
do best to invest to produce the public good if no one else
does so.
Relaxing the assumption of linearity has far-reaching
consequences for the emergence and stability of cooperative
strategies in n-player games. Specifically, when individuals are
unsure about how others are likely to behave in a non-linear
public goods game, then the best strategy is to cooperate
probabilistically (where the probability depends on the cost to
benefit ratio of cooperating and group size, Archetti, 2009a,b;
Archetti and Scheuring, 2011, 2012). Such probabilistic strategies
will emerge even in non-repeated games without spatial
assortment or interactions among relatives. Where players differ
in their ability to invest, or in the benefit that they can extract
from the public good being produced, then this can also offer a
potential solution to a non-linear public goods game, with those
players who will reap the largest benefit from investing being
more likely to contribute to the public good (e.g., see Gavrilets
and Fortunato, 2014; Szolnoki and Perc, 2014). With respect
to the assumption of linearity in benefits, n-player prisoner’s
dilemma games lie at one end of a spectrum with threshold
Public Goods Games (i.e., volunteer’s dilemmas) at the other end.
All intermediate cases (where benefits are a sigmoidal function
of investment in the public good) resemble the volunteer’s
dilemma more than the traditional n-player prisoner’s dilemma
in that they also yield a stable mixed equilibrium of cooperators
and defectors in the population, even in the absence of other
incentives to cooperate (Archetti and Scheuring, 2011). Thus, it
has been argued that many biological examples of cooperation
in social dilemmas are more likely to yield non-linear rather
than linear benefits, which has profound implications for our
understanding of how cooperation evolves and is maintained in
these scenarios (Kummerli et al., 2007; Archetti, 2009a; Sherratt
et al., 2009; Archetti et al., 2011; Archetti and Scheuring, 2012).
For example, the costly production of invertase in yeast, alarm
calling in animal groups and the formation of fruiting bodies in
social amoebas are all examples that can be described as non-
linear public goods games where cooperation is under negative
frequency dependent selection (Gore et al., 2009; Archetti and
Scheuring, 2011; Archetti et al., 2011). Yeast growth requires the
costly production of the enzyme invertase to hydrolyze sucrose
into smaller glucose molecules which can be imported into the
cell (Gore et al., 2009). Although invertase production is costly
and can be parasitized by non-producing cells, a complete lack of
invertase can be lethal, meaning that producer cells outperform
non-producers when rare. Conversely, at high densities of
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producers, non-producing cells have an advantage because they
can parasitize the invertase being produced by the other cells
(Gore et al., 2009).
For humans, it is less clear whether the majority of the social
dilemmas that have shaped our social behavior ought to be
described with linear or with non-linear payoff functions. In
the case of punishment, which has been modeled as a second-
order public good (and often therefore explained in terms of
cultural group selection, e.g., Boyd et al., 2003), it has been
argued that the payoffs of investing in punishment (in terms
of increased within-group cooperation) are likely to scale non-
linearly with number of punishers, thereby providing a direct
individual-level solution for its existence (Raihani and Bshary,
2011). Other social dilemmas that have been explained in terms
of cultural group selection, for example contributions to group
defense during war, might also be more likely to have non-
linear than linear payoffs. Group survival, which is the typical
currency for payoffs associated with cooperating in warfare, is
likely to be a non-linear function of contributions to defense,
meaning that the payoffs associated with increasing within-group
cooperation are by definition non-linear. It may turn out to
be the case that linear public goods problems exist mainly in
artificial laboratory settings and that subjects use strategies and
psychology that evolved predominantly in the context of non-
linear games when they participate. Specifically, if most real-
world public goods problems are non-linear in nature and if there
is always a certain degree of uncertainty about whether others
will contribute to produce the public good (thereby obviating
the need for the subject’s own investment), selection may have
favored strategies that either probabilistically cooperate (when
cooperation is binary) or that invest intermediate amounts (when
cooperation is a continuous variable) (c.f. Kummerli et al., 2010),
even in one-shot games.
PARCELED INVESTMENTS
Finally, we would like to highlight an additional discrepancy
with the way laboratory prisoner’s dilemma experiments are
set up compared with how interactions typically occur in the
real-world. In many experimental games, the act to cooperate
or to defect is an all-or-nothing action where players press
a button, and typically learn about each other’s choices post
hoc. On the other hand, interactions with strangers in our
evolutionary past (e.g., in the context of trades) are highly
unlikely to have involved exchange of closed boxes where
players only found out after separating what the other put
in the box. Instead, real-world interactions with strangers
might often have involved simultaneous or parceled exchanges,
where individuals could monitor the behavior of one another,
make behavioral adjustments in real time and—importantly—
terminate unproductive exchanges prematurely (e.g., Connor,
1992; Hart and Hart, 1992). For example, most female lions
approach intruders simulated by playbacks more slowly if they
teamed up with laggard female group members, apparently
looking back regularly to check the spatial configuration of
self vs. partners (Heinsohn and Packer, 1995). Theoretical
models have shown that where cooperation is not an all-or-
nothing event but investments can instead can be parceled and
adjusted in real time, then prisoner’s dilemma type situations
can be solved cooperatively, even in one-shot anonymous games
(Friedman and Hammerstein, 1991; Connor, 1995; Johnstone
and Bshary, 2002). The key issue is that stable cooperation does
not rely on repeated interactions but on repeated decisions.
The question of whether encounters between strangers (either
currently, or in our evolutionary past) are more likely to
involve single vs. multiple decisions remains open for empirical
exploration.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed potential explanations for the observation
that humans help complete strangers under natural conditions
and often cooperate in laboratory anonymous one-shot games.
While the extent to which humans encountered such situations
in our evolutionary past necessarily remains an open debate, it
is clear that such encounters happen today. Moreover, it appears
that we are at least partly adapted to adjust behavior to such
situations. Our aim was to identify functional explanations for
why humans regularly help strangers under natural conditions.
The main take-home message is that the laboratory settings
deviate from natural encounters in various important ways
that make helping in real-world encounters potentially under
positive selection while it is clearly not in the lab setting. Error-
management arguments suggest that during natural encounters
it is very hard to assess whether an interaction will be one-off
and/or whether the interaction will remain truly anonymous.
Furthermore, while lab games typically impose a forced-play
scenario on subjects, in real-life individuals can choose to pursue
productive relationships and abandon unproductive partners.
This possibility for partner choice might select for helping
behavior even with unknown strangers. Another issue is that in
real-world interactions, the payoffs might often be a non-linear
function of total investment, causing helping to be under negative
frequency dependent selection rather than being altruistic.
Finally, as soon as interactions involve multiple decisions, stable
cooperation may be achieved even between strangers without any
future perspective. We note that these different explanations are
not mutually exclusive and that different explanations are likely
to apply to different real-world scenarios. One way to explore
the importance of the different explanations we proposed would
be to use a wider variety of laboratory games, that replicate
conditions that are likely to prevail in real-world interactions with
strangers.
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